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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
TRISTAN ARLIN JOHNSTON, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 44481
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2014-9356

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tristan Johnston contends the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
his probation and executed his underlying sentence in this case. The information before
the district court reveals that not continuing the period of probation failed to serve the
sentencing goals of rehabilitation and the long-term protection of society. Therefore,
this Court should vacate the order revoking probation and remand this case so that
Mr. Johnston may be returned to probation.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
When Mr. Johnston was eighteen years old, he had sexual relationships with
several girlfriends.

(See Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.)
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While he thought those relationships were lawful under the “three year rule,” see
I.C. § 18-6101(1)-(2), that was not accurate in all cases. (See PSI, pp.3, 7.) As a
result, he pled guilty to three counts of statutory rape. (R., p.58.) He had no record
previous to these convictions. (PSI, p.6.)
Mr. Johnston expressed remorse for his behavior. (PSI, pp.11, 15.) He also
explained that alcohol abuse had played a factor in his poor decision-making. (PSI,
p.11.)

However, the GAIN-I evaluation concluded Mr. Johnston did not have a

substance dependence or substance abuse issue, and so, did not recommend
treatment in that regard. (PSI, pp.228-29, 234.) A psychosexual evaluation concluded
he was moderately amenable to treatment and was as likely as most other offenders to
comply with the terms of supervision. (PSI, pp.20, 54.) The district court ultimately
imposed three concurrent unified terms of ten years, with two years fixed. (R., p.59.)
The district court also suspended those sentences for a ten-year term of probation.
(R., p.59.)
For the first several months, during which the district court held periodic review
hearings, Mr. Johnston appeared to be successful on probation.

(See generally

R., pp.73-78.) For example, the district court required him to work toward obtaining his
GED, and at one of the review hearings, he provided the district court with his GED test
results. (R., pp.73, 78.) However, he ultimately admitted to several violations of the
terms of his probation, and the district court revoked his probation, although it also
decided to retain jurisdiction over the case. (R., pp.107-11.)
Mr. Johnston completed a rider program during that period of retained jurisdiction
despite struggling some in that program. (PSI, pp.278-79.) The rider staff attributed
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those struggles primarily to Mr. Johnston being generally immature and socially
awkward. (See, e.g., PSI, p.279.) The rider staff concluded that, despite his struggles,
Mr. Johnston was still amenable to treatment and supervision in the community.
(PSI, p.279.) While the rider staff’s evaluation indicated Mr. Johnston had issues with
drug or alcohol dependency, the staff ultimately deferred to the conclusions from the
GAIN-I evaluation.

(PSI, p.278.)

Accordingly, they did not recommend substance

abuse treatment as part of Mr. Johnston’s probation treatment plan. (See PSI, p.286.)
Although the prosecutor argued that the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over
Mr. Johnston, the district court decided to suspend his sentences for a ten-year period
of probation. (R., pp.114-18.)
According to his probation officer, Mr. Johnston was “eager to do well on
supervision and was on a path for success.” (R., p.138.) He had obtained full-time
employment right after being released on probation. (R., p.137.) He was not acting in a
way which gave his probation officer concern that he was abusing drugs or alcohol.
(R., p.138.) However, in an effort to show off for some new friends (see Tr., p.15,
Ls.14-16; PSI, p.265), Mr. Johnston decided to steal some cell phone cases for himself
and those friends. (See, e.g., PSI, pp.263, 265.) He was “honest and cooperative” with
police. (R., p.145.) He ultimately pled guilty to one count of petit theft for his actions.1
(See Tr., p.7, Ls.7-10.) He also admitted the corresponding allegation of probation
violation in this case. (Tr., p.8, L.16-19.) His probation officer noted, “This new arrest
came as a surprise as he [Mr. Johnston] appeared to be doing very well.” (R., p.138.)

1

The petit theft case is not on appeal here.
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Prior to the disposition hearing, Mr. Johnston requested a mental health
evaluation to help him “get a better understanding of what is going on with the decisionmaking process that he makes and hopes to break the cycle that he is making.”
(Tr., p.11, Ls.19-23; accord. Tr., p.13, Ls.6-12.)

The mental health evaluation

concluded that Mr. Johnston does, in fact, suffer from alcohol abuse disorder and
cannabis abuse disorder. (PSI, p.268.) It also noted that he potentially suffers from
depression,

anxiety,

and/or

schizophrenia,

though

the

evaluator

explained

Mr. Johnston’s over-reporting of symptoms made it difficult to accurately diagnose him
in that regard.

(PSI, pp.268-69.)

Nevertheless, the evaluator recommended

Mr. Johnston participate in long-term outpatient treatment for his substance abuse
issues and his mental health issues in addition to his sex offender treatment. (PSI,
p.270.) At the disposition hearing, Mr. Johnston explained he was willing to immediately
engage in those new treatment programs.

(Tr., p.13, Ls.13-20.)

Defense counsel

added that revoking probation and executing Mr. Johnston’s sentences would simply
“put[] him at risk to continue a downward slide and make things worse.” (Tr., p.11,
Ls.15-17.) Accordingly, they requested the district court place Mr. Johnston back on
probation to give him the opportunity to act on the new information and treatment
recommendations provided by the mental health evaluation. (Tr., p.12, Ls.12-25; p.14,
Ls.23-25.)
However, the district court decided to revoke Mr. Johnston’s probation, noting
that he had only been out for two months before committing this new offense.
(Tr., p.15, Ls.13-25.)

Mr. Johnston filed a notice of appeal timely from the order

revoking his probation and executing his sentence. (R., pp.173-74.)

4

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Johnston’s probation
and executing his underlying sentence.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Johnston’s Probation And
Executing His Underlying Sentence
The decision to revoke probation is one within the district court’s discretion.
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). The district court must determine
“whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of
the probation is consistent with the protection of society.” Id. In this case, a sufficient
consideration of the evidence demonstrates continuing Mr. Johnston’s probation would
be consistent with rehabilitation and protection of society.
As Mr. Johnston’s probation officer explained, Mr. Johnston “was eager to do
well on supervision and was on a path for success.” (R., p.138.) However, as the new
mental health examination concluded, Mr. Johnston was struggling with alcohol abuse
disorder and cannabis abuse disorder. (PSI, p.268.) It also noted Mr. Johnston was
potentially suffering from depression, anxiety, and/or schizophrenia. (PSI, pp.268-69.)
As such, it recommended adding outpatient treatment programs, particularly for his
substance abuse issues, to Mr. Johnston’s rehabilitation efforts. (PSI, p.270; accord
Tr., p.12, Ls.5-11.)
The new diagnosis from the mental health evaluation, particularly in regard to the
substance abuse issues, represents an important change, since both his previous
periods of probation were structured based on the initial GAIN-I evaluation’s conclusion
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that no such issues existed. Therefore, Mr. Johnston’s rehabilitation, and thus, the
long-term protection of society, would be best served by giving Mr. Johnston the
opportunity to actually act on that new, more precise diagnosis and begin the
recommended community-based treatment programs he has not had the opportunity to
participate in previously.
That fact, particularly when considered alongside the fact that Mr. Johnston had
started off well on this period of probation, demonstrates that continued probation was
not only consistent with the goals of rehabilitation and protection of society, but was
actually the best option to promote those goals.

As defense counsel noted at the

disposition hearing, the alternative of simply incarcerating Mr. Johnston, who was only
twenty years old at the time of the disposition hearing (see PSI, p.2; R., p.162), would
only “put[] him at risk to continue a downward slide and make things worse.” (Tr., p.11,
Ls.15-17.)

Since the alternative of incarceration did not serve either the goal of

rehabilitation or the long-term protection of society, the district court’s decision to revoke
Mr. Johnston’s probation and execute his underlying sentence constitutes an abuse of
the district court’s discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Johnston respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order revoking his
probation and remand this case so that he may be returned to probation.
DATED this 24th day of January, 2017.

_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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